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This class action involves run-flat tires (“RFTs”).  As 
their name suggests, they can “run” while “flat.”  Even if an 
RFT suffers a total and abrupt loss of air pressure from a 
puncture or other road damage, the vehicle it is on remains 
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stable and can continue driving for 50 to 150 miles at a speed 
of up to 50 miles per hour. 
Jeffrey Marcus leased a BMW convertible equipped 
with four Bridgestone RFTs.  Unfortunately, he experienced 
four “flat” tires during his three-year lease.  In each case, the 
RFT worked as intended.  Even though the tire lost air 
pressure, Marcus was able to drive his car to a BMW dealer 
to have the tire replaced.  Unsatisfied nonetheless, Marcus 
sued Bridgestone Corporation, Bridgestone Americas Tire 
Operations, LLC (“BATO”) (together “Bridgestone”), and 
BMW of North America, LLC (“BMW”), asserting consumer 
fraud, breach of warranty, and breach of contract claims.  
Among other things, he claims that Bridgestone RFTs are 
“defective” because they:  (1) are “highly susceptible to flats, 
punctures and bubbles, and . . . fail at a significantly higher 
rate than radial tires or other run-flat tires;” (2) cannot be 
repaired, only replaced, “in the event of a small puncture;” 
and (3) are “exorbitantly priced.”  J.A. 91, 100, 102.  He also 
claims RFT-equipped BMWs cannot be retrofitted to operate 
with conventional, non-run-flat tires, and that “many service 
stations do not sell” Bridgestone RFTs, making them difficult 
to replace.  J.A. 91, 92.  He faults BMW and Bridgestone for 
failing to disclose these “defects.” 
The District Court certified Marcus’s suit under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) as an opt-out class 
action brought on behalf of all purchasers and lessees of 
certain model-year BMWs equipped with Bridgestone RFTs 
sold or leased in New Jersey with tires that “have gone flat 
and been replaced.”  For the reasons that follow, we part from 
the District Court.  Among other problems, on the record 
before us, Marcus’s claims do not satisfy the numerosity and 
predominance requirements.  We thus vacate the District 
Court’s certification order and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In July 2007, Jeffrey Marcus (a New York resident) leased 
a 2007 BMW 328ci from an authorized BMW dealership in 
Ramsey, New Jersey.  The convertible first caught his eye at 
another dealership in South Hampton, New York.  He saw the 
car on the showroom floor and, interest piqued, picked up a 
brochure.  Aside from visiting the dealership, picking up the 
brochure, and riding in a friend’s 328ci as a passenger, 
Marcus claims he “absolutely [did] not” do any other research 
on BMW vehicles or RFTs before leasing his car.  J.A. 875. 
As noted, Marcus suffered four “flat”1
Marcus’s first two flat tires were not available for 
inspection in this lawsuit.  Dealer records show that a nail 
punctured the first tire and the second was replaced due to a 
“blown out bubble.”  J.A. 407-08.  Marcus’s third tire was 
replaced because he ran over a chunk of metal “the size of a 
finger,” according to his own expert, and his fourth because 
he ran over another sharp object that tore and gouged the tire 
and damaged the sidewall.  J.A. 300.  The parties’ experts 
agree that the third and fourth tires could not have been 
 tires during his 
three-year lease.  Each time he experienced a flat, he drove 
his car to a BMW dealership in New York and had the tire 
replaced.  BMW then billed Marcus between $350 to $390 for 
parts, labor, fees, and taxes.  See J.A. 407-11.  After his first 
flat, Marcus purchased a road-hazard warranty for about 
$400, which covered at least some of the replacement costs 
for flat tires two through four.  See J.A. 880. 
                                              
1 As noted in our introduction, RFTs do not go “flat” in the 
conventional sense.  When discussing RFTs, we use the term 
“flat” to mean a tire that has suffered a loss of air pressure 
and been replaced. 
7 
 
repaired, and that any tire (run-flat or conventional) would 
have been damaged, if not destroyed, under the 
circumstances.  See J.A. 300, 414-15.  They also agree on two 
other, more general propositions:  (1) a tire can “go flat” or 
fail for a wide variety of reasons and not be a “defective” tire; 
and (2) to determine properly and accurately the cause of any 
particular tire failure, a careful and thorough examination of 
that tire is necessary.  See J.A. 305, 399, 1476-77. 
The parties dispute what Marcus knew about RFTs and 
RFT-equipped BMWs before leasing his car and, more 
importantly, what other purchasers and lessees could have 
known.  To “provide a market and consumer perspective” on 
RFTs and BMWs, BMW presented the expert report and 
testimony of William Pettit.  See J.A. 1761-76.  He concluded 
that “[a]n abundance of [RFT] information exists in the public 
domain extolling the safety and convenience benefits and 
discussing potential downsides.”  J.A. 1769.  He pointed to 
BMW and Bridgestone documents (e.g., their press releases 
and marketing brochures), as well as information from the 
public domain (e.g., articles in publications like Consumer 
Reports, BusinessWeek, The Wall Street Journal, and The 
New York Times). 
To take but a few examples, BMW boasts in its 
brochures that “should you get a flat, you can still travel up to 
150 miles at 50 mph, thanks to [the 2007 BMW 3 Series 
Convertible’s] standard run-flat tires,” J.A. 329, “so you can 
drive off a busy highway, out of a dangerous area, or just 
continue on your journey on a rainy night,” J.A. 1108.  In 
several other places, its brochures mention that the car comes 
equipped with RFTs and that, “[d]ue to low-profile tires, 
wheels, tires and suspension parts are more susceptible to 
road hazard and consequential damages.”  J.A. 366, 374, 377, 
380.  A warning about road hazard susceptibility also appears 
in Bridgestone’s tire warranty — “low aspect ratio tires, with 
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reduced sidewall height, may be more susceptible to damage 
from potholes, road hazards, and other objects such as curbs” 
— as well as in BMW press releases from July 2006 and 
March 2007.  See J.A. 577, 579, 580, 993, 1449.  In addition, 
the BMW Owner’s Manual for the 328i warns drivers that, 
“[f]or safety reasons, BMW recommends that damaged Run-
Flat Tires be replaced rather than repaired.”  J.A. 1558.  
BMW’s “Approved Tires” brochure similarly advises 
consumers that “[w]hile some tire manufacturers will allow 
tire repairs, BMW only recommends replacement of damaged 
tires.”  J.A. 1092.  BMW and Bridgestone also highlight 
information from the public domain.  An April 2006 
BusinessWeek article says, “Run-flat tires aren’t cheap.  Four 
Bridgestone Blizzak Run-Flats cost about $1,200, compared 
with perhaps $500 to $800 for comparable conventional 
tires.”  J.A. 762.  Sounding a similar note, an article from the 
June 2007 Consumer Reports mentions that some RFT 
owners have complained about “limited replacement choices” 
and “high replacement costs.”  J.A. 961.  However, this report 
concludes that “[d]espite the disadvantages and 
inconveniences of run-flat tires for many, Consumer Reports 
believes that the safety benefits can outweigh the downsides.”  
Id. 
Marcus disputes BMW’s and Bridgestone’s openness 
about RFTs, the information available in the public domain, 
and whether this information is sufficient to provide 
consumers with notice about the downsides of Bridgestone 
RFTs.  He offers internal BMW and Bridgestone documents 
— such as emails, research reports and marketing surveys — 
to show that the defendants were aware that many other 
consumers were as displeased with RFTs as he was. 
After his second flat tire, Marcus sued BMW and 
Bridgestone.  In his Amended Class Action Complaint, he 
asserts claims against BMW and Bridgestone: (1) on behalf of 
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a nationwide class, for breach of implied warranty in 
violation of the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”); 
and (2) on behalf of a New Jersey sub-class for (a) consumer 
fraud in violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act 
(“NJCFA”), (b) breach of implied warranty, (c) breach of 
contract, and (d) breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing.  He also asserts a claim on behalf of the New 
Jersey sub-class for breach of express warranty against 
BMW. 
The District Court denied Marcus’s motion for class 
certification with respect to the nationwide class, but granted 
the motion with respect to the New Jersey sub-class.  See 
Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 08-5859 (KSH), 2010 
WL 4853308 (D.N.J. Nov. 19, 2010).  The Court did not 
provide a definition of the class it certified, though it cross-
referenced the docket entry for Marcus’s amended notice of 
motion for class certification.  That notice sought certification 
of a 
New Jersey state subclass consisting of [any] 
and [a]ll current and former owners and lessees 
of 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 BMW vehicles 
equipped with run-flat tires manufactured by 
Bridgestone and/or BATO and sold or leased in 
[New Jersey] whose Tires have gone flat and 
been replaced (excluded from the Class and the 
Sub-Class are Defendants, as well as 
Defendants’ affiliates, employees, officers and 
directors, including franchised dealers, and any 
person who has experienced physical injury as a 
result of the defects at issue in this litigation) . . 
. . 
J.A. 198. 
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II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d).  Having granted BMW’s and Bridgestone’s 
petitions for leave to appeal under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(f), we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(e). 
“We review a class certification order for abuse of 
discretion, which occurs if the district court’s decision rests 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion 
of law or an improper application of law to fact.”  In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).  “[W]hether an 
incorrect legal standard has been used is an issue of law to be 
reviewed de novo.”  Id. 
III. PRELIMINARY MATTERS 
“The class action is an exception to the usual rule that 
litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual 
named parties only.”  Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 
2541, 2550 (2011) (quotation marks omitted).  To invoke this 
exception, every putative class action must satisfy the four 
requirements of Rule 23(a) and the requirements of either 
Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3).  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b).  To 
satisfy Rule 23(a), 
(1) the class must be “so numerous that joinder 
of all members is impracticable” (numerosity); 
(2) there must be “questions of law or fact 
common to the class” (commonality); (3) “the 
claims or defenses of the representative parties” 
must be “typical of the claims or defenses of the 
class” (typicality); and (4) the named plaintiffs 
must “fairly and adequately protect the interests 
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of the class” (adequacy of representation, or 
simply adequacy). 
In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 291 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23).  Rule 23(b)(3), the basis for 
certification here, “requires that (i) common questions of law 
or fact predominate (predominance), and (ii) the class action 
is the superior method for adjudication (superiority).”  Id. 
“[T]he requirements set out in Rule 23 are not mere 
pleading rules.”  Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 316; see 
also Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.  The party seeking 
certification bears the burden of establishing each element of 
Rule 23 by a preponderance of the evidence.  See Hydrogen 
Peroxide, 553 F.3d at 307.  Echoing the Supreme Court, we 
have repeatedly “emphasize[d] that ‘[a]ctual, not presumed[,] 
conformance’ with Rule 23 requirements is essential.”  Id. at 
326 (quoting Newton v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 167 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Gen. 
Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982))).   
To determine whether there is actual conformance with 
Rule 23, a district court must conduct a “rigorous analysis” of 
the evidence and arguments put forth.  Id. at 316 (quoting 
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161).  When doing so, the court cannot be 
bashful.  It “must resolve all factual or legal disputes relevant 
to class certification, even if they overlap with the merits — 
including disputes touching on elements of the cause of 
action.”  Id. at 307.2
                                              
2 As a practical matter, the certification decision is typically a 
game-changer, often the whole ballgame, for plaintiffs and 
plaintiffs’ counsel.  See Newton, 259 F.3d at 167 (“[D]enying 
or granting class certification is often the defining moment in 
class actions (for it may sound the ‘death knell’ of the 
  Rule 23 gives no license to shy away 
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from making factual findings that are necessary to determine 
whether the Rule’s requirements have been met. 
Before considering Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3), we 
address two preliminary matters:  (1) whether the District 
Court clearly defined the parameters of the class and the 
claims to be given class treatment, as required by Rule 
23(c)(1)(B); and (2) whether the class must be (and, if so, is 
in fact) objectively ascertainable. 
A. The Class Definition and the Claims to be Given 
Class Treatment 
“An order that certifies a class action must define the 
class and the class claims, issues, or defenses . . . .”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B).  Specifically, “the text of the order or an 
incorporated opinion must include (1) a readily discernible, 
clear, and precise statement of the parameters defining the 
class or classes to be certified, and (2) a readily discernible, 
clear, and complete list of the claims, issues or defenses to be 
treated on a class basis.”  Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 
453 F.3d 179, 187 (3d Cir. 2006).  Clearly delineating the 
contours of the class along with the issues, claims, and 
defenses to be given class treatment serves several important 
purposes, such as providing the parties with clarity and 
assisting class members in understanding their rights and 
making informed opt-out decisions.  Id. 
                                                                                                     
litigation on the part of plaintiffs, or create unwarranted 
pressure to settle nonmeritorious claims on the part of 
defendants) . . . . ”).  Appropriately, attentiveness to “the 
potential for unwarranted settlement pressure” coincides with 
a court’s obligation to conduct a “rigorous analysis” of 
whether a plaintiff has demonstrated actual conformance with 
Rule 23.  Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 310. 
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The definition of the class certified here is not clear 
and precise.  Rather than set out its own definition, the 
District Court noted in its certification order that 
“[c]ertification of the New Jersey sub-class is granted  [D.E. 
144],” cross-referencing the docket entry for Marcus’s 
amended notice of motion for class certification.  That notice 
sought certification of a 
New Jersey state subclass consisting of [any] 
and [a]ll current and former owners and lessees 
of 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 BMW vehicles 
equipped with run-flat tires manufactured by 
Bridgestone and/or BATO and sold or leased in 
the United States whose Tires have gone flat 
and been replaced (excluded from the Class and 
the Sub-Class are Defendants, as well as 
Defendants’ affiliates, employees, officers and 
directors, including franchised dealers, and any 
person who has experienced physical injury as a 
result of the defects at issue in this litigation) . . 
. . 
J.A. 198.  Although Marcus’s notice of motion defines the 
New Jersey subclass in terms of vehicles “sold or leased in 
the United States,” the Court mentions in its accompanying 
opinion that the subclass is “limited to those who bought or 
leased their cars in New Jersey.”  Marcus, 2010 WL 4853308 
at *1.  
Even with this correction, however, the parameters of 
Marcus’s class definition are far from clear.  As written, the 
definition seems to include not only (1) owners and lessees 
who bought or leased a new or used BMW from a New Jersey 
BMW dealership, but also (2) subsequent owners and lessees 
who bought or leased a used BMW in New Jersey from 
anyone, not just BMW dealers, and even (3) subsequent 
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owners and lessees who bought or leased a used BMW 
anywhere in the country from anyone whose BMW was 
initially bought or leased in New Jersey.  When confronted 
with this ambiguity at oral argument, Marcus’s counsel 
clarified that the “intent” was to include only owners and 
lessees of new BMWs purchased or leased in New Jersey 
from BMW dealerships with original-equipment Bridgestone 
RFTs.  See Oral Arg. Tr. 20:19-:24.  Even if the District 
Court shared counsel’s understanding of the class definition, 
counsel’s post hoc clarification is no substitute for a “readily 
discernible, clear, and precise statement of the parameters 
defining the class . . . to be certified” in either the certification 
order or accompanying opinion.  Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 187. 
In addition, the certification order does not define the 
claims, issues, or defenses to be treated on a class basis at all.  
The District Court’s opinion does address Marcus’s claims 
and the issues presented, but we cannot find “a readily 
discernible, clear, and complete list.”  Id.; see also id. at 189 
(noting that an opinion that forces us to “comb the entirety of 
its text” and “cobble together the various statements” in 
search of “isolated statements that may add up to a partial list 
of class claims, issues, or defenses falls short of the readily 
discernible and complete list of class claims, issues, or 
defenses required by the Rule”). 
Rule 23(c)(1)(B) requires more, and thus a remand.  If 
Marcus continues to attempt to certify a class, he needs to 
provide the Court with a more clearly defined class and set of 
claims, issues, or defenses to be given class treatment. 
B. Ascertainability 
Many courts and commentators have recognized that 
an essential prerequisite of a class action, at least with respect 
to actions under Rule 23(b)(3), is that the class must be 
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currently and readily ascertainable based on objective criteria.  
See, e.g., John v. Nat. Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 501 F.3d 443, 
445 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 
471 F.3d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 2006); Crosby v. Social Sec. Admin. 
of the U.S., 796 F.2d 576, 580 (1st Cir. 1986); see also 
Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 271 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(holding that “defining a class by reference to those who 
‘believe’ they were discriminated against undermines the 
validity of the class by introducing a subjective criterion into 
what should be an objective evaluation”), abrog. on other 
grounds by Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 318 n.18; 
Johnson v. Geico Cas. Co., 673 F.Supp.2d 255, 268 (D. Del. 
2009); Agostino v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 437, 
478 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2009); 1 William B. Rubenstein et al., 
Newberg on Class Actions, § 3:2-3:3 (5th ed.); 7A Charles 
Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1760 
(3d ed. 2005).  If class members are impossible to identify 
without extensive and individualized fact-finding or “mini-
trials,” then a class action is inappropriate.  Some courts have 
held that where nothing in company databases shows or could 
show whether individuals should be included in the proposed 
class, the class definition fails.  See Clavell v. Midland 
Funding LLC, No. 10-3593, 2011 WL 2462046, at *4 (E.D. 
Pa. June 21, 2011); Sadler v. Midland Credit Mgmt, Inc., 
No.06-C-5045, 2008 WL 2692274, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 
2008); In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Wage & Hour Litig., No. 
C 06-2069 SBA, 2008 WL 413749, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 
2008); Deitz v. Comcast Corp., No. C 06-06352 WHA, 2007 
WL 2015440, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2007). 
The ascertainability requirement serves several 
important objectives.  First, it eliminates “serious 
administrative burdens that are incongruous with the 
efficiencies expected in a class action” by insisting on the 
easy identification of class members. Sanneman v. Chrysler 
Corp., 191 F.R.D. 441, 446 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2000).  Second, 
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it protects absent class members by facilitating the “best 
notice practicable” under Rule 23(c)(2) in a Rule 23(b)(3) 
action.  See Manual for Complex Litigation, § 21.222 (4th ed. 
2004).  Third, it protects defendants by ensuring that those 
persons who will be bound by the final judgment are clearly 
identifiable.  See Xavier v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 787 F. 
Supp. 2d 1075, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“Ascertainability is 
needed for properly enforcing the preclusive effect of final 
judgment.  The class definition must be clear in its 
applicability so that it will be clear later on whose rights are 
merged into the judgment, that is, who gets the benefit of any 
relief and who gets the burden of any loss.  If the definition is 
not clear in its applicability, then satellite litigation will be 
invited over who was in the class in the first place.”); 1 
William B. Rubenstein et al., Newberg on Class Actions, § 
3:1 (5th ed.). 
The proposed class raises serious ascertainability 
issues.  In its briefs, BMW claims that it “may be able to 
identify current and former original owners and lessees of 
BMW vehicles factory-equipped with Bridgestone RFTS 
which were initially purchased or leased from New Jersey 
dealerships.”  BMW Br. at 38 (emphasis in original); see also 
BMW Reply Br. 8.  At oral argument, BMW’s counsel was 
even less optimistic.  He suggested that BMW could not 
know which of the vehicles that fit the class definition had 
Bridgestone RFTs because “[t]hey’re made in Germany by a 
different company,” and BMW does not have a “parts 
manifest.”  See Oral Arg. Tr. 16:3-16:8.  To complicate 
matters further, not every car that comes onto a dealership lot 
with Bridgestone RFTs necessarily leaves the lot with the 
same tires.  According to BMW, dealers might change the 
tires at a customer’s request.  In any event, says BMW, even 
if the proper cars with the proper tires could be identified, 
defendants’ records would not indicate whether all potential 
class members’ Bridgestone RFTs “have gone flat and been 
17 
 
replaced,” as the class definition requires, because the class is 
not limited to those persons who took their vehicles to BMW 
dealers to have their tires replaced. 
If Marcus attempts to certify a class on remand, the 
District Court — adjusting the class definition as needed —  
must resolve the critical issue of whether the defendants’ 
records can ascertain class members and, if not, whether there 
is a reliable, administratively feasible alternative.  We 
caution, however, against approving a method that would 
amount to no more than ascertaining by potential class 
members’ say so.  For example, simply having potential class 
members submit affidavits that their Bridgestone RFTs have 
gone flat and been replaced may not be “proper or just.”  See 
Xavier, 787 F.Supp.2d at 1089-90 (rejecting plaintiffs’ 
ascertainability proposal to have potential class members 
submit affidavits about their smoking histories).  BMW and 
Bridgestone will be able to cross-examine Marcus at trial 
about whether and why his tires “have gone flat and been 
replaced.”  Forcing BMW and Bridgestone to accept as true 
absent persons’ declarations that they are members of the 
class, without further indicia of reliability, would have serious 
due process implications.3
                                              
3 The class definition and ascertainability problems spill into 
the predominance inquiry as well.  According to BMW and 
Bridgestone, the District Court could not have properly 
conducted a choice-of-law analysis because the class 
definition includes “unidentified persons from jurisdictions 
unknown.”  See BMW Br. at 45; see also BMW Reply Br. at 
19 (“[T]he nebulous class definition . . .  makes the choice-of-
law analysis difficult if not impossible.”).  If the District 
Court finds on remand an ascertainable class, and clarifies its 
definition accordingly, then the defendants can renew their 
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IV. RULE 23(A)4
 
 
A. Numerosity 
Rule 23(a)(1), which requires that a class be “so 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,” 
promotes three core objectives.  First, it ensures judicial 
economy.  It does so by freeing federal courts from the 
onerous rule of compulsory joinder inherited from the English 
Courts of Chancery and the law of equity.  See 1 Rubenstein, 
supra, § 1:12.  Courts no longer have to conduct a single, 
administratively burdensome action with all interested parties 
compelled to join and be present.  Id.  The impracticability of 
joinder, or numerosity, requirement also promotes judicial 
economy by sparing courts the burden of having to decide 
numerous, sufficiently similar individual actions seriatim.  Id. 
at § 3:11.  As for its second objective, Rule 23(a)(1) creates 
greater access to judicial relief, particularly for those persons 
with claims that would be uneconomical to litigate 
individually.  See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 
797, 809 (1985).  Finally, the rule prevents putative class 
representatives and their counsel, when joinder can be easily 
                                                                                                     
choice-of-law arguments as they relate to predominance.  We 
note, however, that predominance is not defeated merely 
because different states’ laws apply to different class 
members’ claims.  See Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 
273, 301-02 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).  In this regard, “Rule 
23(b)(3) requires merely that common issues predominate, 
not that all issues be common to the class.”  Id. (quoting 
Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 
2003) (emphasis added)). 
4 BMW and Bridgestone do not challenge the District Court’s 
finding that Marcus is an adequate representative of the class. 
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accomplished, from unnecessarily depriving members of a 
small class of their right to a day in court to adjudicate their 
own claims.  7A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 1762 (3d ed. 2005). 
There is no minimum number of members needed for a 
suit to proceed as a class action.  See Stewart v. Abraham, 275 
F.3d 220, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2001).  We have observed, 
however, that “generally if the named plaintiff demonstrates 
that the potential number of plaintiffs exceeds 40, the first 
prong of Rule 23(a) has been met.”  Id.  Nonetheless, Rule 
23(a)(1) “requires examination of the specific facts of each 
case.”  Gen. Tel. Co. of the N.W. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 
(1980).  Critically, numerosity — like all Rule 23 
requirements — must be proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 307. 
When a plaintiff attempts to certify both a nationwide 
class and a state-specific subclass, as Marcus did here, 
evidence that is sufficient to establish numerosity with respect 
to the nationwide class is not necessarily sufficient to 
establish numerosity with respect to the state-specific 
subclass.  The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision in Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. is particularly 
instructive on this point.  564 F.3d 1256, 1266-68 (11th Cir. 
2009).  There, the Court reversed a finding of numerosity 
concerning a proposed class of all T-Mobile employees in 
Florida who received commissions for the sale of cellphone 
plans.  It held that the plaintiff could not simply rely on the 
nationwide presence of T-Mobile to satisfy the numerosity 
requirement without Florida-specific evidence: 
Vega has not cited, and we cannot locate in the 
record, any evidence whatsoever (or even an 
allegation) of the number of retail sales 
associates T-Mobile employed during the class 
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period in Florida who would comprise the 
membership of the class, as certified by the 
district court. 
Yes, T-Mobile is a large company, with 
many retail outlets, and, as such, it might be 
tempting to assume that the number of retail 
sales associates the company employed in 
Florida during the relevant period can overcome 
the generally low hurdle presented by Rule 
23(a)(1).  However, a plaintiff still bears the 
burden of establishing every element of Rule 
23, and a district court’s factual findings must 
find support in the evidence before it. In this 
case, the district court’s inference of numerosity 
for a Florida-only class without the aid of a 
shred of Florida-only evidence was an exercise 
in sheer speculation. 
Id. at 1267 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes 
omitted). 
Like Vega, Marcus offered sufficient company-wide 
evidence to the District Court to support a finding of 
numerosity for a nationwide class.  According to BMW, it 
sold or leased 740,102 vehicles equipped with RFTs 
nationwide during the class period.  But not all those vehicles 
came with Bridgestone RFTs.  The group includes cars with 
RFTs from seven different manufacturers — Goodyear, 
Pirelli, Michelin, Dunlop, Continental, Uniroyal, and 
Bridgestone.  With respect to these 740,102 vehicles, BMW 
recorded and produced 582 unique customer contacts from 
consumers across the nation who called BMW to complain 
about their RFTs.  Of those 582 customers, 196 specifically 
identified their RFTs as Bridgestone RFTs.  Marcus 
submitted 29 of the 582 complaints as evidence of the 
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proposed nationwide class’s numerosity.  In addition, he 
submitted records, obtained from various companies offering 
road hazard products, showing thousands of claims made for 
road hazard damage on 2006-2009 BMW vehicles.  He even 
provided loss-ratio data (the ratio of dollars received in 
premiums to dollars paid out in claims) for one warranty 
company’s contracts covering BMWs.  Piled on top of that 
were internal BMW emails about customer complaints 
regarding Bridgestone RFTs. 
But after digging through this supposed mountain of 
evidence, we can only speculate as to how many 2006-2009 
BMWs were purchased or leased in New Jersey with 
Bridgestone RFTs that have gone flat and been replaced.  To 
begin, we can only guess as to how many 2006-2009 BMWs 
were purchased or leased in New Jersey regardless of tire 
brand.  That information is not in the record.  There is also no 
evidence of how many of the 740,102 vehicles bought and 
leased nationwide had Bridgestone RFTs.  No evidence 
shows that BMW purchased tires from its seven RFT-
suppliers in roughly equal proportions or even if Bridgestone 
was among its larger or smaller suppliers.  As noted, Marcus 
submitted 29 of the 582 nationwide complaints as evidence of 
numerosity.  The complaints, however, do not indicate in any 
readily apparent way whether the complaining customers 
purchased or leased their vehicles in New Jersey.  Four 
complaining customers did list New Jersey addresses.  See 
J.A. 1612, 1632, 1634, 1636.  But only two of these four 
customers referred to Bridgestone RFTs specifically, and one 
of them apparently accepted $500 in “Lifestyle Gifts” as a 
settlement from BMW.  See J.A. 1634, 1636-43.  And, like 
Marcus, they could have crossed state lines to purchase or 
lease their cars.  Not to pile on, but Marcus has not pointed us 
to any evidence in the record — not in the customer 
complaints, the road hazard warranty claims, the loss-ratio 
data, or the internal BMW emails — that identifies another 
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purchaser or lessee of a 2006-2009 BMW that was sold or 
leased in New Jersey and equipped with Bridgestone RFTs 
that have gone flat and been replaced.  In short, he has offered 
proof of only one potential class member:  himself.   
Nonetheless, the District Court found that the New 
Jersey class met the numerosity requirement because “it is 
common sense that there will be more members of the class 
than the number of consumers who complained — probably 
significantly more,” and “common sense indicates that there 
will be at least 40.”  Marcus, 2010 WL 4853308 at *3.  That 
may be a bet worth making, but it cannot support a finding of 
numerosity sufficient for Rule 23(a)(1). 
As we explained in Hydrogen Peroxide, a district court 
must make a factual determination, based on the 
preponderance of the evidence, that Rule 23’s requirements 
have been met.  See 552 F.3d at 307.  Mere speculation is 
insufficient.  See 7A Wright, supra, § 1762 (collecting cases); 
Roe v. Town of Highland, 909 F.2d 1097, 1100 n.4 (7th Cir. 
1990) (“The party supporting the class cannot rely on 
conclusory allegations that joinder is impractical or on 
speculation as to the size of the class in order to prove 
numerosity.”) (quotation marks omitted).  Of course, Rule 
23(a)(1) does not require a plaintiff to offer direct evidence of 
the exact number and identities of the class members.  But in 
the absence of direct evidence, a plaintiff must show 
sufficient circumstantial evidence specific to the products, 
problems, parties, and geographic areas actually covered by 
the class definition to allow a district court to make a factual 
finding.  Only then may the court rely on “common sense” to 
forgo precise calculations and exact numbers.  See In re 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 
450, 468, 510 (D.N.J. 1997), aff’d 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 
1998) (finding numerosity requirement satisfied without 
pinpointing an exact number because the evidence suggested 
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a class of over 8,000,000 policyholders and “[c]ommon sense 
suggest[ed] that it would be at best extremely inconvenient to 
join all class members”); cf. Lloyd v. City of Phila., 121 
F.R.D. 246, 249 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1988) (refusing to certify 
a class when, despite plaintiff’s “mere speculation” that the 
class could exceed 10,000 employees, the evidence 
demonstrated that only the four plaintiffs met the class 
definition). 
Given the complete lack of evidence specific to 
BMWs purchased or leased in New Jersey with Bridgestone 
RFTs that have gone flat and been replaced, the District 
Court’s numerosity ruling crossed the line separating 
inference and speculation.  BMW is a large company that 
sells and leases many cars throughout the country, many with 
RFTs.  But the Court did not certify a nationwide class of 
BMW owners and lessees with any brand of RFTs.  It 
certified a New Jersey class of owners and lessees with 
Bridgestone RFTs that have gone flat and been replaced.  It is 
tempting to assume that the New Jersey class meets the 
numerosity requirement based on the defendant companies’ 
nationwide presence.  But the only fact with respect to 
numerosity proven by a preponderance of the evidence is that 
Marcus himself is a member of the proposed class.  “[I]f there 
are no members of the class other than the named 
representatives, then Rule 23(a)(1) obviously has not been 
satisfied.”  7A Wright, supra, § 1762.   And “we are not 
prepared to read the numerosity requirement out of the class 
action rule,” as we have no authority to do so.  Gurmankin v. 
Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1132, 1135 (3d Cir. 1980).  Accordingly, 
we hold that the District Court abused its discretion by 
finding the numerosity requirement to be satisfied with 
respect to the New Jersey class.   
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B. Commonality 
Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement “does not 
require identical claims or facts among class member[s].”  
Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 2004), abrog. 
on other grounds by Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 318 
n.18.  “For purposes of Rule 23(a)(2), even a single common 
question will do.”  Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2556 (quotation marks 
and alterations omitted); see also In re Schering Plough Corp. 
ERISA Litig., 589 F.3d 585, 597 (3d Cir. 2009). 
Marcus seeks to offer evidence about, among other 
things, whether Bridgestone RFTs are “defective,” whether 
the defendants had a duty to disclose those defects, and 
whether the defendants did in fact fail to disclose those 
defects.5
                                              
5 Whether Marcus has alleged actionable “defects” or simply 
trade-offs that a consumer should consider in the purchase or 
lease calculus was the not the question before the District 
Court at the certification stage nor is it the one before us now.  
So while BMW argues that it had no duty to provide 
purchasers and lessees with a part-by-part price list for each 
of its vehicles and warn them about Bridgestone RFTs being 
“exorbitantly priced,” we cannot consider that argument at 
this stage of the litigation. 
  These issues of fact and law (or some subset of 
them) apply to each of Marcus’s causes of actions against 
each of the defendants, and are issues common to all class 
members. Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding the commonality requirement to be 
satisfied. 
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C. Typicality 
The concepts of typicality and commonality are 
closely related and often tend to merge.  See Baby Neal v. 
Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994).  “Both serve as 
guideposts for determining whether under the particular 
circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical 
and whether the named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims 
are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will 
be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.”  Falcon, 
457 U.S. at 158 n.13.  Typicality, however, derives its 
independent legal significance from its ability to “screen out 
class actions in which the legal or factual position of the 
representatives is markedly different from that of other 
members of the class even though common issues of law or 
fact are present.”  7A Wright, supra, § 1764.   
To determine whether a plaintiff is markedly different 
from the class as a whole, we consider the attributes of the 
plaintiff, the class as a whole, and the similarity between the 
plaintiff and the class.  See Schering Plough, 589 F.3d at 597.  
This comparative analysis addresses 
three distinct, though related, concerns: (1) the 
claims of the class representative must be 
generally the same as those of the class in terms 
of both (a) the legal theory advanced and (b) the 
factual circumstances underlying that theory; 
(2) the class representative must not be subject 
to a defense that is both inapplicable to many 
members of the class and likely to become a 
major focus of the litigation; and (3) the 
interests and incentives of the representative 
must be sufficiently aligned with those of the 
class. 
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Id. at 599.  If a plaintiff’s claim arises from the same event, 
practice or course of conduct that gives rises to the claims of 
the class members, factual differences will not render that 
claim atypical if it is based on the same legal theory as the 
claims of the class.  Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 
980 F.2d 912, 923 (3d Cir. 1992).   
 The District Court found that Marcus is typical of the 
class, because “[w]hat is crucial to the typicality analysis here 
is that Marcus and the class members purportedly suffered 
harm from the same alleged course of conduct:  the 
defendants failed to disclose defects in their products, 
misrepresented or omitted important information about the 
products, and made promises about the products that were not 
true.”  Marcus, 2010 WL 4853308 at *6.  BMW and 
Bridgestone argue that the Court erred in its finding for three 
reasons.  First, Marcus performed very little research before 
leasing his car, whereas the average BMW purchaser or 
lessee performs significant research prior to purchase or lease.  
Second, Marcus leased only one model BMW with one kind 
of Bridgestone RFT, yet he seeks to represent a class 
composed of people with other model-year BMWs and 
Bridgestone tire types.  According to Bridgestone, Marcus’s 
claims potentially cover 49 different tire designs of varying 
specifications, including size, load rating, and model type.  
Third, New York law — not New Jersey law — applies to 
Marcus’s claims and, as a result, Marcus is subject to unique 
defenses that do not apply to all members of the proposed 
class.  We see no abuse of discretion behind any of these 
arguments. 
First, even if there are marked differences in the 
amounts of research class members performed, these 
differences by themselves do not render Marcus’s claims 
atypical.  As discussed below, if a class member knew about 
the alleged “defects” prior to purchase or lease, then that 
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knowledge could break the proximate cause link between the 
alleged defect and any damages suffered.  Determining 
whether a class member had such knowledge requires an 
individualized inquiry.  That creates a predominance problem.  
If Marcus knew of the defects prior to his lease, then he 
would risk having the causal link between the defendants’ 
conduct and his damages broken.  If that were so, he would 
be unable to represent fairly the interests of class members 
who did not have such knowledge.  That would create a 
typicality problem.  But Marcus may be in a better position 
than other potential class members because he did not do 
significant research before leasing his car.  That fact may 
distinguish him from other class members, but it does not 
prejudice his ability to protect absent class members’ interests 
fairly and adequately. 
The fact that Marcus leased only one model BMW 
with one kind of Bridgestone RFT also does not pose a 
typicality problem.  When a class includes purchasers of a 
variety of different products, a named plaintiff that purchases 
only one type of product satisfies the typicality requirement if 
the alleged misrepresentations or omissions apply uniformly 
across the different product types.  See, e.g., Wiener v. 
Dannon Co., 255 F.R.D. 658, 666-67 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 
2009); Gonzalez v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 247 F.R.D. 616, 
621-22 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2007); Lewis Tree Serv. Inc. v. 
Lucent Techs. Inc., 211 F.R.D. 228, 232-34 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
20, 2002); Kaczmarek v. Int’ Bus. Machs. Corp., 186 F.R.D. 
307, 313 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1999).  The parties agree that 
different tire models and sizes, and different vehicles, have 
different performance characteristics, compositions, designs, 
purposes, and uses.  But Marcus alleges that the problems 
with Bridgestone RFTs — that they are highly susceptible to 
road hazard damage, unrepairable, expensive, difficult to 
purchase, and that a vehicle cannot be converted for use of 
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conventional tires — are uniform and apply to all 2006-2009 
BMW vehicles equipped with Bridgestone RFTs. 
As we discuss below with respect to predominance, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion when finding that a 
defect making Bridgestone RFTs highly susceptible to road 
hazard damage will show itself in a substantially similar way 
across the various tire models and sizes at issue here.  Nor is 
there any indication that BMW’s and Bridgestone’s 
representations differed significantly depending on the 
model-year BMW or specification of Bridgestone RFT.  
Therefore, the fact that Marcus leased only one model BMW 
with one kind of Bridgestone RFT does not pose a typicality 
problem. 
Finally, “[i]t is well-established that a proposed class 
representative is not ‘typical’ under Rule 23(a)(3) if ‘the 
representative is subject to a unique defense that is likely to 
become a major focus of the litigation.’” Schering Plough, 
589 F.3d at 598 (quoting Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 
291, 301 (3d Cir. 2006)).  “Other courts of appeals 
emphasize, as do we, the challenge presented by a defense 
unique to a class representative — the representative’s 
interests might not be aligned with those of the class, and the 
representative might devote time and effort to the defense at 
the expense of issues that are common and controlling for the 
class.”  Beck, 457 F.3d at 297.  Here, BMW and Bridgestone 
argue that New York law, not New Jersey law, applies to 
Marcus’s claims and, along with it, certain unique defenses.  
For example, they claim that New York law, unlike New 
Jersey law, requires privity of contract in order to pursue a 
claim for breach of implied warranty.  Compare Arthur Jaffe 
Assocs. v. Bilsco Auto Serv. Inc., 89 A.D.2d 785, 785 (App. 
Div. 1982), aff’d 448 N.E.2d 792, 792 (N.Y. 1983), with 
Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Augusta, 288 F.3d 67, 73-76 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (applying New Jersey law). 
29 
 
The defendants presented this argument to the District 
Court, but it did not respond to it.   The Court did conduct a 
choice-of-law analysis with respect to the class members’ 
MMWA claims when considering issues of predominance.  It 
did not, however, conduct a choice-of-law analysis with 
respect to Marcus’s consumer fraud or common law claims 
when considering issues of typicality, specifically whether 
Marcus’s claims are subject to unique defenses that are likely 
to become a major focus of the litigation.  But even if New 
York, rather than New Jersey, law applies to Marcus’s claims, 
BMW and Bridgestone have failed to demonstrate how any 
defenses unique to Marcus’s claims will become a major 
focus of the litigation.  On remand, the parties and the District 
Court may find that the contours of the litigation have 
changed significantly and what will or will not likely be a 
major focus of the litigation will have to be assessed.  We 
leave this to the District Court to address when and if the 
issue should arise. 
V. RULE 23(B)(3):  PREDOMINANCE6
Under Rule 23(b)(3), “questions of law or fact 
common to class members [must] predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members.”  This 
predominance requirement “tests whether proposed classes 
are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by 
representation.”  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591, 623 (1997).  To assess predominance, a court at the 
certification stage must examine each element of a legal claim 
“through the prism” of Rule 23(b)(3).  In re DVI, Inc. Sec. 
 
                                              
6 Neither BMW nor Bridgestone challenge on appeal the 
District Court’s findings that a class action is the superior 
method for adjudication. 
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Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 630 (3d Cir. 2011).  A plaintiff must 
“demonstrate that the element of [the legal claim] is capable 
of proof at trial through evidence that is common to the class 
rather than individual to its members.”  Hydrogen Peroxide, 
552 F.3d at 311.  “Because the nature of the evidence that 
will suffice to resolve a question determines whether the 
question is common or individual, a district court must 
formulate some prediction as to how specific issues will play 
out in order to determine whether common or individual 
issues predominate in a given case.” Id. (quotation marks 
omitted). 
Marcus asserts four claims on behalf of the New Jersey 
class against BMW and Bridgestone:  (1) violations of the 
NJCFA; (2) breach of the implied warranty of 
merchantability; (3) breach of contract; and (4) breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  He also 
asserts a claim for breach of express warranty against BMW.  
We consider the elements of these claims through the prism 
of the predominance requirement to determine whether they 
are capable of proof with common, class-wide evidence. 
A. The Common Law Claims7
The essence of each of Marcus’s common law claims 
(at least for purposes of our predominance analysis) is that he 
 
                                              
7 Like the District Court, we refer to Marcus’s breach of 
warranty, breach of contract, and breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims as his 
“common law” claims, even though the breach of implied 
warranty claims now derive from New Jersey statutes.  See 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-314. 
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purchased a defective product that caused him damage.8
                                              
8 “To state a claim for breach of the implied warranty of 
merchantability . . . , a plaintiff must allege (1) that a 
merchant sold goods, (2) which were not ‘merchantable’ at 
the time of sale, (3) injury and damages to the plaintiff or its 
property, (4) which were was caused proximately and in fact 
by the defective nature of the goods, and (5) notice to the 
seller of injury.”  In re Ford Motor Co. E-350 Van Prods. 
Liab. Litig. (No. II), No. 03-4558 (HAA), 2008 WL 4126264 
at *19 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2008).  A claim for breach of express 
warranty similarly requires proof of proximate cause.  See 
Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., 315 A.2d 16, 20 n.4 (N.J. 1974) 
(“[P]roximate cause and damages. . . . are, of course, 
necessary for a breach of express warranty verdict.”); 
Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602, 607 (3d Cir. 
1958) (“The measure of damages for a breach of warranty is, 
under New Jersey law, the loss directly and naturally 
resulting in the ordinary course of events from such breach”) 
(emphases added).  To state a claim for breach of contract, a 
plaintiff must “[1] show that the parties entered into a valid 
contract, [2] that the defendant failed to perform his 
obligations under the contract and [3] that the plaintiff 
sustained damages as a result.”  Murphy v. Implicito, 920 
A.2d 678, 689 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (quotation 
marks omitted).  Marcus’s implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing claims also hinge on his purchasing a defective 
product that caused him damage. See Amended Class Action 
Complaint (J.A. 109-110) (“BMW breached those implied 
covenants by selling or leasing to Plaintiff and members of 
the Sub-Class Vehicles that were not fit for ordinary use, and 
that were equipped with Tires that were inherently defective 
  In 
his complaint, Marcus alleges that Bridgestone RFTs (and, in 
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turn, the BMW vehicles that they equip) are defective for 
several reasons:  (1) Bridgestone RFTs pop or sustain bubbles 
from use under normal driving conditions, making them more 
susceptible to road hazard damage than conventional tires and 
other brands of RFTs; (2) they cannot be repaired in the event 
of even a small puncture; and (3) they are extremely 
expensive to replace.  In addition, he alleges that his BMW 
vehicle is defective because it cannot be reconfigured to 
operate with conventional tires. 
The District Court found that Marcus could prove 
these alleged defects at trial with common, class-wide 
evidence.  BMW and Bridgestone contest the Court’s finding 
with respect to the first alleged defect.9
1. Common Proof of Susceptibility to 
Road Hazard Damage 
  They also argue that 
issues of proximate causation — i.e., determining why each 
class member’s tires “have gone and been replaced” — will 
require individualized inquiries that will predominate over 
any common ones. 
According to BMW and Bridgestone, Marcus has 
failed to identify any particular defect that supposedly makes 
Bridgestone RFTs more susceptible to road hazard damage 
                                                                                                     
when BMW knew, or should have known, that the Tires were 
defective. . . . As a direct and proximate result of BMW’s 
breach of its implied covenants, Plaintiffs and Class members 
have been damaged.”); see id. at 111-12 (making similar 
allegations against Bridgestone). 
9 Because BMW and Bridgestone do not challenge the 
District Court’s findings that, with respect to Marcus’s 
common claims, the other alleged defects are capable of 
common proof, we need not consider them. 
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than other tires.  In addition, they claim that any defect — 
should one exist at all — will not be evident uniformly across 
all tires, regardless of size or other specifications, included in 
the class definition.  They argue that the District Court erred 
by accepting without question Marcus’s expert testimony on 
these points without considering their own. 
In In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, we 
clarified a district court’s duty when confronted with 
competing expert testimony about a plaintiff’s ability to prove 
a claim through evidence that is common to the class.  552 
F.3d at 307, 322-24.  We held that “the court’s obligation to 
consider all relevant evidence and arguments [on a motion for 
class certification] extends to expert testimony, whether 
offered by a party seeking class certification or by a party 
opposing it.”  Id. at 307.  We explained that “[e]xpert opinion 
with respect to class certification, like any matter relevant to a 
Rule 23 requirement, calls for rigorous analysis.”  Id. at 323.  
Therefore, “[w]eighing conflicting expert testimony at the 
certification stage is not only permissible[, but] it may be 
integral to the rigorous analysis Rule 23 demands,” especially 
when a party opposing certification offers its own competing 
expert opinion.  Id.  We further assured district courts that 
“[r]igorous analysis need not be hampered by a concern for 
avoiding credibility issues.”  Id. at 324.  In that case, we ruled 
that the district court abused its discretion because it appeared 
to have assumed that it was barred from weighing one expert 
opinion against another for the purpose of determining 
whether the requirements of Rule 23 had been met, 
specifically whether the plaintiff’s claims were susceptible to 
common proof.  Id. at 322. 
Like the District Court in Hydrogen Peroxide, the 
District Court here was confronted with conflicting expert 
testimony about whether the plaintiff could prove its claim 
with common proof.  On the one hand, Marcus’s tire expert, 
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Charles Gold, opined on the similarity of Bridgestone RFTs.  
After “a detailed analysis of the thousands of pages of 
specifications produced,” he found that “all Bridgestone run-
flat tires relevant to this action, despite variations due to size, 
are substantially similar in construction.”  J.A. 1978-79.  He 
concluded that “a proven defect arising from construction 
would manifest itself in all relevant tires.”  J.A. 1979.  In 
addition, Gold suggests in his expert report that not only 
would all Bridgestone RFTs have a similar defect, but in fact 
they all do have a particular defect.  He explains that the 
major difference between RFTs and conventional tires is the 
inclusion of extra components added to the sidewall and 
assemblies of RFTs, allowing RFTs to be operated at zero, or 
near zero, inflation pressure.  J.A. 1978.  “Unfortunately,” he 
adds, these same components stiffen the tire during regular 
inflated use and “[t]he extra stiffness [in RFTs] can make the 
tire more susceptible to road hazard damages during normal 
use.”  J.A. 1978-1979.   
BMW and Bridgestone counter by highlighting that 
Gold recanted his “extra stiffness” opinion during his 
deposition.  He admitted he had no published testing, studies 
or scientific data to support his opinion.  J.A. 2031-32.  In 
fact, Gold admitted that he “cannot offer an opinion, to a 
reasonable degree of engineering certainty, that Bridgestone 
RFTs are more susceptible to road-hazard damage during 
normal use.”  J.A. 2074-75.  When Bridgestone and BMW 
moved to exclude Gold’s opinion, Marcus too seems to have 
changed course with respect to the “stiffness” theory.  Rather 
than rely on that theory, he argued (and still argues now) that 
Bridgestone RFTs are more susceptible to road hazard 
damage because they are “low aspect ratio” tires and that 
proof of this “defect” is found in the defendants’ own 
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documents, not in any expert report.  Marcus Br. 27-28; J.A. 
2138.10
Despite this apparent retreat from Gold’s “stiffness” 
theory, the District Court found that Marcus “has offered 
evidence that because run-flat tires are, universally, 
substantially stiffer than conventional tires, they are therefore 
more susceptible to road hazard damage.  Such evidence 
makes it likely that common issues of proof will establish the 
class members’ claims.”  Marcus, 2010 WL 4853308, at *13.  
Ultimately, however, whether Bridgestone RFTs are more 
susceptible to road hazard damage than other tires — due to 
their “extra stiffness,” their low aspect ratio, or anything else 
— is not the issue before us.  Our inquiry is limited to 
whether the District Court abused its discretion when finding 
that, should a defect exist at all in Bridgestone RFTs that 
makes them more susceptible to road hazard damage, Marcus 
will be capable of proving that defect at trial through 
evidence that is common to the class rather than individual to 
its members.  See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311.   
  
On this point, the Court discussed and apparently 
credited Gold’s similarity opinion.  Marcus, 2010 WL 
4853308, at *4, *5 (noting that Marcus “will also offer Gold’s 
                                              
10 An aspect ratio is, roughly speaking, the relationship 
between the height and width of a tire.  A tire with a low 
aspect ratio, sometimes referred to as a low profile tire, is 
short and squatty and generally provides for better handling.  
J.A. 421.  Bridgestone argues that a low aspect ratio is not a 
defect.  It is simply a design trade-off that allows for better 
handling at the cost of a softer ride, among other things.  
Bridgestone Reply Br. 8-10.  To repeat, see supra note 5, 
whether Marcus has alleged actionable “defects” or non-
actionable design trade-offs is not before us. 
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expert testimony that all Bridgestone run-flat tires, regardless 
of model, are substantially similar” and that “Gold’s expert 
testimony opines that all of Bridgestone’s run-flat tires are 
substantially similar, irrespective of model”).  Bridgestone 
offered its own expert evidence (reports and deposition 
testimony from its experts, Brian Queiser and James Gardner) 
that the different tires and sizes in the class are not 
substantially similar given the differences in design, 
components and materials in different tires specified as 
standard and optional equipment for different BMW vehicles.  
J.A. 399; 401-06; 413-15; 424-26; 452-53.  The District Court 
did not explicitly discuss these expert opinions, which 
challenge the similarity opinion of Marcus’s expert. 
Although we would prefer a more explicit discussion 
and comparison of Bridgestone’s competing expert testimony 
from the District Court to aid our appellate review, we cannot 
conclude that the Court abused its discretion in violation of 
Hydrogen Peroxide.  Unlike the District Court’s opinion in 
Hydrogen Peroxide, nothing in the District Court’s opinion in 
our case suggests that it assumed it was barred from weighing 
the credibility of the expert opinions.  Instead, it appears that 
the Court — consistent with Hydrogen Peroxide — simply 
found Gold’s opinion about the similarity of Bridgestone 
RFTs to be more persuasive than the opinions put forth by 
Bridgestone.  This was not an abuse of discretion. 
2. Common Proof of Proximate 
Causation 
Having found that Marcus could show a common, 
class-wide defect, the District Court then found he could 
show, without resort to individual proofs, that this defect 
caused the class members’ damages.  Considering the 
damages that Marcus alleges, we believe the District Court’s 
causation finding was an abuse of discretion. 
37 
 
Recall that Marcus defines the class in terms of certain 
owners and lessees of BMW vehicles with Bridgestone RFTs 
that “have gone flat and been replaced.”  He claims that “[a]ll 
class members were damaged when their tires suffered a flat 
and they were forced to pay for a new Tire or when they 
purchased road hazard coverage to insulate them from 
financial hardship due to cost of the Tires.”  Pl’s Am. Br. in 
Support of Class Cert. (J.A. 1255).  Accordingly, he asserts 
that “[e]ach Class member’s damages can be measured by the 
cost of a replacement Tire.  For Class members who 
purchased road hazard coverage, the damages will be the 
greater of either the cost of replacement Tires or the cost of 
road hazard coverage.”  Id. at 1253-54.   
But these damages allegations beg the question of 
what caused class members’ tires to go flat and need 
replacement.  Causation is pivotal to each of Marcus’s claims.  
See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-314 cmt. 13 (discussing 
how, in an action based on breach of warranty, “it is of course 
necessary to show . . . that the breach of warranty was the 
proximate cause of the loss sustained,” and that “an 
affirmative showing by the seller that the loss resulted from 
some action or event following his own delivery of the goods 
can operate as a defense”).  Here the District Court should 
have addressed an undisputed, fundamental point:  any tire 
can “go flat” for myriad reasons.  See J.A. 307-308, 448.  
Even “defective” tires can go flat for reasons completely 
unrelated to their defects.  Critically, to determine why a 
particular class member’s Bridgestone RFT has “gone flat 
and been replaced” requires an individual examination of that 
class member’s tire.  See J.A. 305, 399, 1476-77.  These 
individual inquiries are incompatible with Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
predominance requirement.  
In another RFT case brought against BMW and 
Goodyear involving nearly identical allegations as those 
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Marcus makes here, Judge Holwell of the United States 
District Court for Southern District of New York denied class 
certification and aptly explained why individual issues of 
causation create irremediable predominance problems: 
Even if the plaintiffs were to show that the 
Goodyear RFTs suffered from a common 
defect, they would still need to demonstrate that 
this defect caused each class member’s RFT to 
puncture.  But tires can puncture for any 
number of reasons, and not all of these reasons 
will relate to the defect.  As defendants properly 
note, RFTs can go flat for reasons that would 
also cause a standard radial tire to go flat, for 
example, if the driver ran over a nail, tire 
shredding device, or large pothole, or if a 
vandal slashed the tire. . . .  [P]laintiff would 
have to demonstrate in each individual case that 
the tire punctured for reasons related to the 
defect, rather than for a reason that would cause 
any tire to fail. 
Oscar v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 274 F.R.D. 498, 511 
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2011) (“Oscar I”).11
                                              
11 After Judge Holwell denied Oscar’s motion for class 
certification, Judge Engelmayer denied Oscar’s second 
motion for class certification based on causation and 
predominance problems.  See Oscar v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 
No. 09 Civ.11 (PAE), 2012 WL 2359964 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 
2012) (“Oscar II”).  
  Other federal courts 
have also recognized that suits alleging defects “involving 
motor vehicles often involve complicated issues of individual 
causation that predominate over common questions regarding 
the existence of a defect.”  Id. at 510 (collecting cases); see 
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also Chin v. Chrysler Corp., 182 F.R.D. 448, 455  (D.N.J. 
Sept. 11, 1998) (refusing to certify a class of purchasers and 
lessee of vehicles with allegedly defective anti-lock brake 
systems because, among other things, “[e]ven where the 
alleged defect has manifested itself, individual issues of 
actual cause must be adjudicated”). 
Marcus’s own experience illustrates the problem.  Of 
the two tires he presented for inspection in this lawsuit, one 
went “flat” and was replaced because he ran over a jagged 
chunk of metal and the other because he ran over a sharp 
object that tore and gouged the tire and damaged the sidewall.  
See J.A. 300, 400, 409-10.  The experts agree that the two 
tires could not have been repaired and that any tire (run-flat or 
conventional) would also have been damaged under the 
circumstances.  See J.A. 309-10, 400, 412, 414, 426.  In other 
words, it is undisputed that even if Marcus could prove that 
Bridgestone RFTs suffer from common, class-wide defects, 
those defects did not cause the damage he suffered for these 
two tires:  the need to replace them.  In this sense, Marcus is 
no different than a class member who, seconds after buying 
his car, pulls off the dealership lot and runs over a bed of 
nails, as neither can claim a “defect” caused his tires to go flat 
and need replacement.  Because Marcus’s common law 
claims require an individualized inquiry into why any 
particular consumer’s Bridgestone RFTs went flat and had to 
be replaced, the District Court abused its discretion in finding 
that the claims satisfy the predominance requirement. 
B. The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act Claims 
Next, we turn to the District Court’s certification of 
Marcus’s NJCFA claims.  At the outset, it is important to 
disentangle two fundamental questions that are at the core of 
the District Court’s analysis but that can be conflated:  (1) 
Under New Jersey law, what must a plaintiff prove to succeed 
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on an NJCFA claim and what evidence can a defendant put 
forth to rebut and defeat that claim?; and (2) When a plaintiff 
seeks to certify an NJCFA claim for class treatment under 
Rule 23(b)(3), when might common questions of fact fail to 
predominate over individual ones?   
We begin with examining the elements of a NJCFA 
claim.  The NJCFA prohibits certain deceptive commercial 
behavior that it calls “unlawful practice[s].” 
The act, use or employment by 
any person of any unconscionable 
commercial practice, deception, 
fraud, false pretense, false 
promise, misrepresentation, or the 
knowing, concealment, 
suppression, or omission of any 
material fact with intent that 
others rely upon such 
concealment, suppression or 
omission, in connection with the 
sale or advertisement of any 
merchandise or real estate, or with 
the subsequent performance of 
such person as aforesaid, whether 
or not any person has in fact been 
misled, deceived or damaged 
thereby, is declared to be an 
unlawful practice . . . . 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2.  The Attorney General of New 
Jersey may take action under the NJCFA to address an 
“unlawful practice” and, in doing so, “does not have to prove 
that the victim of the fraudulent conduct had ‘in fact been 
misled, deceived or damaged thereby . . . .’ ”  Meshinsky v. 
Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc., 541 A.2d 1063, 1067 (N.J. 1988). 
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A private plaintiff, however, must do more than prove 
an “unlawful practice.”  Another section of the NJCFA 
provides that 
[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss 
of moneys or property, real or personal, as a 
result of the use or employment by another 
person of any method, act, or practice declared 
unlawful under this act or the act hereby 
amended and supplemented may bring an action 
or assert a counterclaim therefor in any court of 
competent jurisdiction.  
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-19 (emphases added).  So, “[w]hile the 
Attorney General does not have to prove that the victim was 
damaged by the unlawful conduct, a private plaintiff must 
show that he or she suffered an ‘ascertainable loss . . . as a 
result of’ the unlawful conduct.”  Meshinsky, 541 A.2d at 
1067.12
An “ascertainable loss” is “either an out-of-pocket loss 
or a demonstration of loss in value” that is “quantifiable or 
measurable.”  Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz U.S.A., LLC, 
872 A.2d 783, 792-93 (N.J. 2005).  Put differently, a plaintiff 
is not required to show monetary loss, but only that he 
 
                                              
12 At times, Marcus erroneously suggests that the lower 
standard of proof applicable to actions by the Attorney 
General applies to his claims as well.  See Marcus Br. at 22-
23 (“Even if . . . class members had differing levels of 
knowledge, such an inquiry is irrelevant under the NJCFA 
because Defendants may be liable under the NJCFA ‘whether 
or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or 
damaged’ by their deception.”) (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 56:8-2). 
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purchased something and received “less than what was 
promised.”  Union Ink Co., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 801 A.2d 
361, 379 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002); see also In re 
Mercedes-Benz Tele Aid Contract Litig., 257 F.R.D. 46, 73 
(D.N.J. Apr. 24, 2009) (“[T]he sum of each class member’s 
loss is the amount necessary to fulfill his or her expectation of 
a functioning [product].)”. 
Importantly, unlike common law fraud, the NJCFA 
does not require proof of reliance.  See Gennari v. Weichert 
Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350, 366 (N.J. 1997).  That is, it does 
not require proof that a consumer would not have purchased a 
product absent the alleged unlawful practice or even proof 
that the unlawful practice played a substantial part in his or 
her decisionmaking.  Cf.  Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 546.  Nonetheless, “the CFA requires a consumer to prove 
that [his or her] loss is attributable to the conduct that the 
CFA seeks to punish by including a limitation expressed as a 
causal link.”  Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 964 A.2d 741, 
748 (N.J. 2009); see also Meshinsky, 541 A.2d at 1067 (“[A] 
plaintiff must establish ‘the extent of any ascertainable loss, 
particularly proximate to a misrepresentation or unlawful act 
of the defendant condemned by the [Act].’”) (quoting 
Ramanadham v. N.J. Mfrs. Co., 455 A.2d 1134, 1136 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982)).  In other words, the alleged 
unlawful practice must be a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s 
ascertainable loss. 
Here, Marcus argues that BMW and Bridgestone 
“violated the NJCFA by failing to disclose salient facts about 
the Tires that would be material to the average consumer who 
is not knowledgeable about tires.”  Marcus Br. at 21.  
Specifically, he asserts that they failed to disclose the alleged 
“defects” previously discussed (i.e., susceptibility to damage, 
repairability, exorbitant price, etc.).  He claims that, as a 
result of BMW’s and Bridgestone’s wrongdoing, he suffered 
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two forms of ascertainable loss:  (a) he spent money to 
replace his tires that went flat, and (b) he leased a product that 
was worth less than what he expected.  See J.A. 101, 103 
(alleging ascertainable loss as “monies spent to replace the 
Tires and/or in diminution in value”). 
To the extent Marcus relies on the cost of replacing his 
tire as his ascertainable loss, his claims cannot meet the 
predominance requirement for the reasons related to causation 
discussed above.  See Oscar I, 274 F.R.D. at 513 
(“[D]etermining whether each tire failed as a result of the 
allegedly concealed defect or as a result of unrelated issues, 
e.g., potholes or reckless driving habits, will devolve into 
numerous mini-trials.”).  The District Court’s NJCFA 
analysis, however, seems to have proceeded on the 
assumption that class members’ ascertainable losses would be 
the value of the product they expected to purchase minus the 
value of the product they actually purchased.  The Court 
noted that, with respect to ascertainable loss, “[t]he relevant 
issue . . . is whether the class members got less than what they 
expected.”  Marcus, 2010 WL 4853308 at *11.  Hence unlike 
his common law claims, Marcus’s NJCFA claims proceed on 
the theory that class members suffered a loss the instant they 
purchased or leased their cars, not when their tires went flat.  
Compare J.A. 101, 103 (alleging with respect to NJCFA 
claims ascertainable loss as “monies spent to replace the Tires 
and/or in diminution in value”), with Pl’s Am. Br. in Support 
of Class Cert. (J.A. 1255) (arguing with respect to the 
common law claims that “[a]ll class members were damaged 
when their tires suffered a flat and they were forced to pay for 
a new Tire or when they purchased road hazard coverage to 
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insulate them from financial hardship due to cost of the 
Tires”).13
In response, BMW and Bridgestone point out that a 
person cannot succeed on an NJCFA claim against them if 
that person knew about the alleged “defects,” yet decided to 
purchase or lease a BMW anyway.  In such a case, under the 
NJCFA any alleged unlawful practice by the defendants 
would not have been the proximate cause of the 
knowledgeable consumer’s ascertainable loss.  Turning to the 
requirements of Rule 23, they then point out that what a 
particular class member knew about Bridgestone RFTs before 
purchase or lease would require an individualized inquiry, 
making Marcus’s NJCFA claims not susceptible to proof with 
common, class-wide evidence. 
 
The District Court concluded that a “presumption of 
causation” should apply to Marcus’s NJCFA claims, and 
therefore that common issues of fact would predominate.  See 
Marcus, 2010 WL 4953308 at *12.  According to the Court, a 
causal relationship between an alleged unlawful practice and 
a consumer’s ascertainable loss may be presumed under the 
NJCFA when a defendant is alleged to have omitted (rather 
                                              
13 We do not consider whether Marcus’s damages allegations 
raise another set of predominance problems on which we may 
soon receive relevant guidance from the Supreme Court.  See 
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, No. 11-864, --S. Ct.-- (June 25, 
2012) (granting certiorari on the question of “[w]hether a 
district court may certify a class action without resolving 
whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible 
evidence, including expert testimony, to show that the case is 
susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis”). 
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than affirmatively misrepresented) material information in 
written representations and when a defendant’s marketing 
statements do not differ from one consumer to another.  Id.  If 
the Court is correct, then Marcus would be able to prove his 
NJCFA claims with nothing more than evidence of BMW’s 
and Bridgestone’s “unlawful practices” (thus common issues 
of fact would predominate). 
To justify this conclusion, both New Jersey law and 
Rule 23 require factual findings that the District Court did not 
make.  What a consumer knew about Bridgestone RFTs prior 
to purchasing or leasing his or her car is highly relevant to 
whether that consumer can succeed on an NJCFA claim.  The 
District Court correctly noted that “[t]he relevant issue . . . is 
whether the class members got less than what they expected.”  
Marcus, 2010 WL 4853308 at *11.  But what a class member 
“expected” of Bridgestone RFTs and BMWs depends on what 
information, if any, about the alleged defects was available 
during the class period and whether that class member knew 
about it.  If a consumer did know about the “defects” but, 
despite that knowledge, still decided to purchase or lease a 
BMW at the same price anyway — because, for example, he 
or she decided that the other safety and convenience benefits 
RFTs and BMWs offer outweigh the costs of their defects — 
then the consumer would not have received something less 
than expected.  If the evidence indicates that this could be 
true for a significant number of class members, then common 
questions of fact will not predominate.  Instead, individual 
issues about what each class member expected when 
purchasing or leasing his or her car would swamp the inquiry, 
making the NJCFA claims inappropriate for class treatment.  
Because, as we explain below, the District Court made its 
“presumption of causation” ruling without making key factual 
findings that the NJCFA and Rule 23 require, it is an “errant 
conclusion of law” and an abuse of discretion.  Hydrogen 
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 312. 
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey has addressed when 
a “presumption of causation” may apply to NJCFA claims in 
two cases:  International Union of Operating Engineers Local 
No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., 929 A.2d 1076 (N.J. 
2007), and Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., LLC, 4 A.3d 561 (N.J. 
2010).  Both cases arose in the context of class actions 
brought under the New Jersey rule that, like Rule 23(b)(3), 
requires a finding of predominance.  See N.J. Ct. R. 4:32-
1(b)(3).  Although we must follow a state’s highest court 
when interpreting state law, see Ill. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Wyndham 
Worldwide Operations, Inc., 653 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 
2011), we decide the legal standards that Rule 23 requires as 
a matter of federal law.  See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 
312.  Given this confluence of state and federal law, we take 
pains to isolate what the NJCFA requires and what Rule 23 
requires in this case. 
International Union involved a putative NJCFA class 
action against Merck, the manufacturer and marketer of the 
pain medication Vioxx.  The class consisted of “third-party 
payors,” such as corporate health insurers and union benefit 
organizations, who administer health benefit plans and make 
payments to pharmaceutical companies for medications 
prescribed to their members.  Int’l Union, 929 A.2d at 1080.  
The plaintiff alleged that Merck fraudulently marketed Vioxx 
as safer and more effective than similar medications, and 
thereby caused class members to afford Vioxx preferred 
status in their “formularies,” the approved listings of drugs 
third-party payors have authorized for purchase.  Id. at 1080-
81. 
Merck argued that class certification was inappropriate 
because class members differed greatly in how their 
formularies dealt with Vioxx, especially as new information 
about the drug became available.  Id. at 1081.  Initially, some 
third-party payors gave Vioxx preferred status and assigned it 
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to a low co-payment tier.  Others put it in a non-preferred tier 
with high co-payments.  Critically, Merck offered evidence 
that third-party payors, when they eventually learned of the 
supposedly fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions, did 
not react uniformly.  Id.  Merck’s expert testified that 
decisionmakers for third-party payors “responded to ongoing 
releases of information about Vioxx in different ways, with 
some altering its placement in their formularies.”  Id.  Merck 
asserted that  
the essence of the claims must be that each class 
member was injured individually when it 
decided, based on defendant’s allegedly 
fraudulent conduct, to include Vioxx in its 
formulary and, more to the point, when it paid 
for the drug purchased by plan members in its 
home state.  . . . [B]ecause each class member 
made that evaluation at different times and 
based on different criteria and because each 
reacted differently with regard to formulary 
placement even after the facts that allegedly 
prove the fraud became known, there are 
overwhelmingly individual, rather than 
common, questions of law and fact. 
Id. at 1087 (emphasis added).   
The Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed with 
Merck that certification of a NJCFA class is not proper 
when class members do not react to misrepresentations 
or omissions in a sufficiently similar manner. 
Plaintiff does not suggest that each of these 
proposed class members, receiving the same 
information from defendant, reacted in a 
uniform or even similar manner.  Rather, the 
48 
 
record speaks loudly in its demonstration that 
each third-party payor . . .  made individualized 
decisions concerning the benefits that would be 
available to its members for whom Vioxx was 
prescribed.  The evidence about separately 
created formularies, different types of tier 
systems, and individualized requirements for 
approval or reimbursement imposed on various 
plans’ members and, to some extent, their 
prescribing physicians, are significant.  That 
evidence convinces us that the commonality of 
defendant’s behavior is but a small piece of the 
required proofs.  Standing alone, that evidence 
suggests that the common fact questions 
surrounding what defendant knew and what it 
did would not predominate. 
Id. (emphasis added).   
As a matter of substantive New Jersey law, 
International Union instructs that when a plaintiff knows the 
truth behind a fraudulent misrepresentation or omission, that 
plaintiff may not succeed under the NJCFA.  Merck presented 
evidence that some third-party payors knew about “the facts 
that allegedly prove the fraud” but did not alter the placement 
of Vioxx in their formularies.  Id. at 1087.  Even if other class 
members did not know that Vioxx was not a safer and more 
effective pain medication than other available products, the 
evidence “spoke loudly” that third-party payors reacted very 
differently to the available information.  So from the class 
action perspective, the case also makes clear that “the 
commonality of [the] defendant’s behavior is but a small 
piece of the required proofs” if class members do not react to 
defendants’ conduct in a sufficiently “uniform or even similar 
manner.”  Id.   
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Three years later, New Jersey’s Supreme Court 
decided Lee v. Carter-Reed Company, L.L.C., which the 
Court described as “fully in line” with International Union.  
Lee, 4 A.3d at 577.  In Lee, a plaintiff sought to certify a class 
of purchasers of Relacore, a dietary supplement the 
defendants marketed as a weight-reduction product with the 
additional benefits of lessening anxiety and elevating mood.  
Id. at 566.  According to the plaintiff, the defendants 
misrepresented the benefits of Relacore in their advertising 
and promotions.  Id.  The Court held that the plaintiff’s 
NJCFA claims satisfied the predominance requirement.  Id. at 
579-80.  It noted that “[i]f the entire marketing scheme was 
based on fictional benefits that Relacore offered, then whether 
the class member enjoyed good or impaired health or took 
other medications would hardly matter.”  Id. at 580.  The 
Court continued that “[w]hen all the representations about the 
product are baseless, a trier of fact may infer the causal 
relationship between the unlawful practice — the multiple 
deceptions — and the ascertainable losses, the purchases of 
the worthless product.”  Id.   
Not surprisingly, the Lee Court gave no indication that 
there was evidence of any class members who could have 
known that Relacore was a “worthless product” but decided 
to purchase it anyway.  Such purchasers would not have been 
able to succeed on their NJCFA claims under New Jersey 
law.  Turning to the predominance requirement, the Lee Court 
noted that,  “[i]n contrast to this case, International Union 
involved a proposed class of diverse entities, which the 
plaintiff did not suggest ‘reacted in a uniform or even similar 
manner’ to the same information broadcast by Merck.”  Id. at 
582 (quoting Int’l Union, 929 A.2d at 1076). 
Read together, International Union and Lee convince 
us that, before applying a “presumption of causation” to an 
NJCFA claim, a court must consider not only the defendants’ 
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course of conduct, but also that of the plaintiffs.  Specifically, 
it must consider whether plaintiffs could have known the truth 
underlying the defendant’s fraud.  See McNair v. Synapse 
Grp., Inc., No. 06-5072 (JLL), 2009 WL 1872582, at *10 
(D.N.J. June 29, 2009) (“Thus, to establish causation under 
the NJCFA the New Jersey Supreme Court [in International 
Union] looked not only to the defendant’s conduct but also to 
the class members’ conduct . . . .”).   
Although not binding on us, we also find the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey’s predominance rulings to be instructive.  
In the class action context, if the truth behind alleged defects 
is knowable and if evidence suggests that class members did 
not react to information about the product they purchased or 
leased in a sufficiently similar manner such that common 
issues of fact would predominate, then certification is 
improper.  See Demmick v. Cellco P’ship, No. 06-2163 (JLL), 
2010 WL 3636216, at*16 (D.N.J. Sept. 8, 2010) (“[A]lleging 
a uniform course of conduct by itself is not sufficient to 
satisfy the predominance element for the causation element of 
a NJCFA claim.”). 
Relying heavily on the Appellate Division of the New 
Jersey Superior Court’s decision in Varacallo v. 
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance, 752 A.2d 807 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000), Marcus argues nonetheless that 
we need not consider class members’ conduct here.  In 
Varacallo, however, the record did not indicate that the facts 
underlying the alleged fraud were knowable to class members 
or, even if they were, that a sufficient number of class 
members would have purchased the product anyway. 
The case involved a putative class of New Jersey 
residents who purchased so-called “vanishing premium” 
whole life insurance policies.  Id. at 808.  A “vanishing 
premium” policy allows insureds to pay premiums out-of-
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pocket for a limited number of years only, until such time as 
dividends can completely fund the purchased plan.  Id.  
Plaintiffs claimed that Mass Mutual violated the NJCFA by 
intentionally inflating its advertised dividend rates and then 
concealing a plan to reduce dividends to insupportable levels.  
They contended that this information was not revealed to 
agents who used Mass Mutual’s prepared illustrations in 
selling the policies.  Id.  Mass Mutual countered that class 
certification would be improper because individual issues of 
causation would predominate over common issues of law and 
fact.   
The Court held that if the plaintiffs established the core 
issue of liability, then they would be entitled to a 
“presumption of reliance and/or causation.”  Id. at 818.  It 
explained: 
It is inconceivable to us, considering the 
assumption that Mass Mutual’s liability is 
premised on a knowing omission of material 
information, that discovery will reveal more 
than a very small number of policyholders who 
would have purchased an N-Pay Policy, rather 
than a competitor’s policy, if the Mass Mutual 
literature stated that the illustrated dividends 
“probably will,” rather than “may,” decrease 
and that the payout period “probably will,” 
rather than “may,” be longer than projected. 
Plaintiffs are required to prove only that 
defendant’s conduct was a cause of damages. 
They need not prove that Mass Mutual’s 
conduct was the sole cause of loss. . . . . It may 
be that some extraordinary sales agent could 
overcome such negative information[,] thereby 
becoming the superceding cause of a 
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policyholder’s loss, but we think it a small 
possibility. 
Id. at 816-17.  In short, unlike in International Union, there 
was no evidence that class members could have known the 
truth behind the defendant’s representations and it was 
“inconceivable” that “more than a very small number” would 
have purchased their policies despite knowing the risks that 
defendants allegedly concealed.  
In this case, the District Court should not have focused 
exclusively on BMW’s and Bridgestone’s conduct, and 
should have made factual findings critical to the 
predominance analysis.  Before certifying a class, the Court 
needed to have found (among other things) either (1) that the 
alleged defects were not knowable to a significant number of 
potential class members before they purchased or leased their 
BMWs, or (2) that, even if the defects were knowable, that 
class members were nonetheless relatively uniform in their 
decisionmaking, which would indicate that, at most, only an 
insignificant number of class members actually knew of the 
alleged defects and purchased or leased their cars at the price 
they did anyway.  These findings cannot be side-stepped.  
They are necessary to determine whether the predominance 
requirement is met in this case.  See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 
F.3d at 316-18.  If class members could have known of the 
alleged defects and the evidence shows that they do not react 
to information about the cars and tires they purchased or 
leased in a sufficiently uniform manner, then individual 
questions related to causation will predominate.  See In re 
Ford Motor Co. E-350 Van Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), No. 
03-4558, 2012 WL 379944 at *14-*15 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2012) 
(denying certification because evidence showed that 
significant information about the alleged defects was in the 
public domain and, as a result, class members who knew “the 
E-350 van to have significant handling problems will have a 
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difficult time proving causation, and in doing so, they would 
not rely on common proof”). 
Marcus disputes that the drawbacks of the tires were 
knowable to class members before purchase.  He claims that 
“[d]efendants have not produced any evidence showing that 
that information [about the drawbacks] was or could have 
been communicated to some class members prior to 
purchase.”  Marcus Br. at 36.  The defendants have, however, 
shown significant evidence that the allegedly omitted 
information was available to class members from various 
sources.  See, e.g., J.A. 462-554; 940-948, 961-1108; 
2308-2310, 2313.  The District Court did not explicitly 
address this issue, however, and it should be the first Court to 
do so. 
Furthermore, the District Court may find that class 
members did not react uniformly when presented with 
information about the cars they purchased or leased.  The 
evidence might suggest that a significant number of class 
members could have known of the alleged “defects,” but 
decided to purchase or lease their cars at the same price 
anyway.  This may be so because other class members may 
consider the features of Bridgestone RFTs and BMWs that 
Marcus styles as “defects” to be simply trade-offs.  Some 
purchasers or lessees may have found that the significant 
safety and convenience benefits RFTs offer in the event of a 
“flat” tire outweighed their downsides.  See, e.g., J.A. 961 
(“Despite the disadvantages and inconveniences of run-flat 
tires for many, Consumer Reports believes that the safety 
benefits can outweigh the downsides.”).  Others may simply 
have had the means to purchase or lease the luxury car of 
their choice and brush off how “exorbitantly” expensive it is 
to replace their tires and how frequently they must do that.  
“For some consumers, the RFTs may have been an important 
factor; for others, not at all; for others, somewhere in between 
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. . . .”  Oscar II, 2012 WL 2359964 at *4.  If, on remand, the 
evidence shows that no more than very few class members 
could have known of the alleged “defects” and — for reasons 
either related or unrelated to RFTs — would have still 
purchased or leased their cars at the same price despite that 
knowledge, then perhaps Marcus’s NJCFA claims may be 
suitable for class treatment.  If not, then individual proof 
would be needed to determine whether a particular class 
member broke the causal link between defect and 
ascertainable loss by purchasing or leasing a car despite 
knowing of the alleged defects. 
That would distinguish this case from Lee and 
Varacallo.  Lee involved a “worthless product” for which “all 
representations . . . [were] baseless.”  4 A.3d at 580.  There 
was no reason for the Lee Court to believe that a significant 
number of class members would, despite knowing that the 
product was worthless, purchase Relacore anyway.  Similarly, 
in Varacallo it was “inconceivable” that “more than a very 
small number” of plaintiffs would purchase a vanishing 
premium insurance policy despite knowing that the promised 
dividend rates were inflated, making that knowledge a 
“superceding cause of a policyholder’s loss.”  752 A.2d at 
816-17.  Here, if the evidence shows on remand that the 
“defects” were knowable and that more than a very small 
number of class members would have purchased or leased 
their cars despite knowing of those defects, then Jeffrey 
Marcus is destined to meet the same fate on his RFT claims 
as Gerald Oscar met on his.  See Oscar I, 274 F.R.D. 498; 
Oscar II, 2012 WL 2359964.    
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 With this context, we vacate the District Court’s 
certification order and remand for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
